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SYMPOSIUM KEYNOTE ADDRESS:  




SH: Thank you very much to Dean Cino and Georgia State 
University Law School and the Law Review for organizing this 
remarkable symposium. As others have noted, it’s humbling to be in 
the same room with so many experts and practitioners in forensic 
science, not to mention the presenters here, Justice Nahmias, and 
Barry Scheck. I notice we have a Twitter stream here, so unlike most 
of you, I have not been trained to speak for more than 140 characters 
at a time. So, I hope you’ll bear with me, especially after that last 
panel, which I thought did so much to give you a glimpse of how 
complicated, and if not structural . . . these problems are.1 [These 
problems] have deep institutional roots that are hard to get at. 
So, I’ve been invited to give an outsider’s perspective of 
uncovering forensic flaws, so I thought to start I would turn to the 
philosopher king of outsiders, Gary Larson, whom some of you may 
remember as the creator of The Far Side cartoon. You might 
remember this one: What We Say to Dogs and What They Hear. And 
I thought of this when I remembered first reading the 2009 NAS 
report on forensic science, which said that, other than DNA, no other 
pattern-based technique had been scientifically validated to match 
evidence to individuals. It recommended removing crime labs from 
government control, and its powerful opening words were that “[f]or 
decades, the forensic science disciplines have produced valuable 
                                                                                                             
* This transcript is a reproduction of the Keynote Address by Spencer Hsu at the 2017–2018 Georgia 
State University Law Review Symposium—From the Crime Scene to the Courtroom: The Future of 
Forensic Science Reform—on April 6, 2018. Spencer Hsu is an investigative reporter at the Washington 
Post, two-time Pulitzer Prize finalist, and national Emmy Award nominee. 
 1. Mr. Hsu’s keynote presentation was preceded by a panel entitled “To Err Is Human,” during 
which panelists discussed the role of human error in forensic evidence collection, evaluation, and 
presentation, with particular attention to causes of error and effective methods for minimizing error. 
1
Hsu: Georgia State Law Review Symposium Keynote Address: Uncovering Fo
Published by Reading Room, 2018
1224 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:4 
evidence that has contributed to the successful prosecution and 
conviction of criminals as well as to the exoneration of innocent 
people.” And it went on to say, though, that “the forensic science 
system, encompassing both research and practice, has serious 
problems that can only be addressed by a national commitment,” and 
it can only be done with a “significant infusion of federal funds.” 
And I think it was a NACDL official who observed that what 
prosecutors heard was the first line: forensic science produced 
valuable evidence; law professors heard that the system had deep 
systemic problems; and practitioners heard a call for a need for an 
infusion of resources. Now, Gary Larson had another cartoon, What 
We Say to Cats, and this might apply to what the judiciary took away 
from the report in terms of questioning the admissibility of forensic 
science. Now, thankfully, as you all know this is not a problem for 
journalists since what people say has no bearing on what we actually 
write. 
So, in that spirit let me talk about, if I can, what Gene asked: how I 
came to write about the FBI hair unit, what I learned about how 
stakeholders addressed errors found in the system, and the role of the 
media. As you just heard, after our stories in 2012, they started with 
20,000 cases that this hair unit had handled. And, what was 
remarkable was that this was the gold standard of the gold standard: 
it’s the FBI lab; it’s the U.S. Department of Justice. This was a unit 
that actually blossomed after Hoover; it was viewed as the next best 
thing after fingerprinting, especially in violent crimes when you had 
biological material that you could test. It’s more specific than blood 
or semen. And, the most serious crimes: rape and murder. And they 
got from there to the 2,500 to 3,000 cases where there was a positive 
match. Three years after our stories appeared, the DOJ and FBI 
formally acknowledged that nearly every one of twenty-eight 
examiners in this elite unit gave flawed testimony in almost all trials 
where they offered evidence and that they overstated matches in 
ways that favored prosecutors 95% of the time and that included 
thirty-two defendants sentenced to death. Now, we need to caveat 
that [for] many of these people, there is abundant evidence of their 
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crimes, many were convicted of other crimes, and also many pleaded 
guilty. But, in the [District of Columbia] alone, there have been six 
DNA exonerations for people who’ve served decades in prison. The 
district has about 1/500 of the population of the U.S. 
So let me start in the middle of the story, which is really the story 
of Donald Gates and his remarkable lawyer, Sandra Levick of the 
D.C. Public Defender’s Service. Donald Gates was an Ohio man 
sentenced to life in prison after being convicted for raping and 
murdering a Georgetown University student in Rock Creek Park in 
1981 in D.C. FBI agent Michael Malone found two hairs from an 
African American male on the victim’s body and matched them to 
Gates, who was also implicated by a purported confession to a paid 
jailhouse informant. Gates always maintained his innocence, and in 
about 1999, he read or heard of DNA fingerprinting on a radio show, 
and he wrote the trial judge. So, if you’re counting references to a 
media role, here’s one. He said to the judge, “You don’t want to 
convict an innocent man. There is this thing called DNA 
fingerprinting, but if you give me a lawyer then I will show you I 
didn’t commit the crime.” So, the trial judge, now Chief D.C. 
Superior Court Judge Fred Ugast, appointed an attorney, Roger 
Durban. They got the physical evidence, tested by cell mark, but the 
testing technology at that point was unable to get results with the 
DNA available. And Gates’ petition was dismissed. By this time he 
had exhausted his appeals. This was sort of his last gasp before he 
would disappear without anyone hearing from him again. 
But then in 2007, inspired by another newspaper article—Sandy 
Levick thinks it was maybe an editorial in the New York Times 
noting the two-hundredth DNA exoneration—Roger Durban read 
that, remembered Mr. Gates’ case, and wrote another letter to the 
judge, copied to the D.C. [Public] Defender Service. He couldn’t 
remember Gates’ name. He had details of the case though, and he 
said something to the effect that there is not a time that goes by when 
he drives by those woods at the base of the Rock Creek Park near the 
Kennedy Center, where the crime occurred, that he didn’t wonder if 
Gates might still be on this earth and hoped that with the advances in 
3
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DNA technology that someone would look into his case. He would 
do it himself except he had Parkinson’s disease, he said, and he 
couldn’t practice law anymore. So that is how Sandy Levick got the 
case, and Judge Ugast, after he retired, kept it. There were ups and 
downs. There was an order in the early round of testing to preserve 
the evidence, but it had been lost or destroyed. No one could find a 
trial transcript, but they did recover appellate court decisions, 
pleadings and motions for re-trial. 
But the key break came from Jim Traynor, who was a D.C. 
homicide detective, and he ran a cold case unit with the help of 
criminal justice graduate students in Maryland. He found the physical 
evidence and a duplicate set of slides kept at the D.C. Medical 
Examiner’s Office. They took duplicates of autopsy slides after 
sending them off to the FBI; they kept them in refrigerated storage 
for twenty-seven years. And that is how it was found that Gates could 
not have committed the crime. He was exonerated just before 
Christmas 2009, set free after twenty-seven years. Prosecutors in 
2012 traced the crime scene evidence to another man who died the 
year before, an office temp in the building where the victim worked. 
A federal jury later determined that police had framed Gates; 
detectives fed incriminating details to the informant. And if the story 
had ended there, it would have been extraordinary but not unheard of. 
Even so, look at the many steps it took: the homicide detective, the 
police, the lawyers, the medical examiner’s office. 
While waiting for the DNA results to come back, Sandy Levick’s 
husband was driving her to a conference at NYU on Brady v. 
Maryland, and she started reading about hair evidence. So there’s 
another reference. She had a brainstorm: if we know that hair 
analysis is kind of sketchy, what do we know about the hair 
examiner? Just a few days before those lab results came back, she got 
a package back from the FBI, and it was Gates’ FBI file, which she 
had FOIA’d months before.2 On the top sheet it said, “Do not 
                                                                                                             
 2. The Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, “provides that any person has the right to request 
access to federal agency records or information,” unless the information requested is protected by an 
exception to the Act. The Freedom of Information Act, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://foia.state.gov/Learn/FOIA.aspx [https://perma.cc/2V6J-8M27] (last visited July 6, 2018). To have 
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remove.” It was a cover sheet that referred to FBI hair examiner 
Michael Malone and a confidential government review of his work. 
Around that time she also got a thumb drive from another former FBI 
agent, Fred Whitehurst, who had FOIA’d more than 10,000 pages of 
DOJ and FBI records from that nine-year review of Malone and 
twelve other FBI agents. His work had been discredited in a 1997 
inspector general (IG) report triggered by Whitehurst’s 
whistleblowing. 
To take people back to the bad old days—and the positive side of 
this is look at how much progress has occurred—Whitehurst was a 
chemist and lawyer who worked in the FBI’s crime lab. He testified 
in New York federal court in 1995 that there was a great deal of 
pressure from his FBI lab superiors to bias evidence or ignore 
findings that did not support the prosecution’s theory. In fact, 
Whitehurst had written or passed along scores of memos over the 
years warning of a lack of impartiality in scientific standards. The IG 
went on to find that the chief of the lab explosives unit, for example, 
repeatedly reached conclusions that incriminated defendants without 
a scientific basis in the 1995 Oklahoma City federal building 
bombing. The head of toxicology lacked judgement and credibility 
and overstated results in the 1994 O.J. Simpson investigation. After 
the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, the key FBI witness 
worked backwards tailoring his testimony to reach the result he 
wanted in the trial of “The Blind Sheikh” suspected of plotting the 
attack, Omar Abdel-Rahman. Other agents “spruced up” notes for 
trial, altered reports without the author’s permission, or failed to 
document or confirm their findings. 
So the Bromwich Report in 1997, the inspector general report, 
stopped short of saying any convictions should be overturned or that 
any convictions were jeopardized, and also of concluding that anyone 
committed perjury. But it did lead the FBI to overhaul its practices, 
its procedures, and its accreditation going forward. That was really a 
paradigm shift that I think led to the others. 
                                                                                                             
“FOIA’d” information is to have submitted a request for the information under the Act. 
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In that case though, the DOJ also committed to review, by 
coincidence, another 3,000 defendants’ cases over what eventually 
took nine years. These were cases handled by the thirteen agents 
whose work was questioned. And they pledged to turn over any 
exculpatory information to defendants. They ultimately found 402 
cases of defendants whose handling was so problematic that this 
Brady task force commissioned a new review of findings. But, what 
we learned in our reporting was that the Department reported its 
findings only to prosecutors, not to defendants, and never issued a 
public report. And, the one news story that I could find by AP by 
John Solomon, who later was an editor at the Post and the 
Washington Times, said, “DOJ officials, speaking on condition of 
anonymity, left the impression that anyone whose case had been 
affected had been notified, and in any case, no convictions have been 
overturned.” 
In reality, as we found, while many prosecutors made swift and 
full disclosures, in most cases they did incompletely, years later, or 
not at all. And that was how Sandy Levick found out just before 
Christmas in 2009, through her FBI FOIA, that Donald Gates 
should’ve been notified twelve years earlier, in 1997, that Michael 
Malone’s hair match case on which his conviction hinged, was 
questioned by the DOJ because Michael Malone had been deemed 
[not] credible. 
Fred Whitehurst’s information was potentially even more 
troubling. In the thousands of pages of these task force documents, 
almost all of the hundreds of re-reviewed cases were by that agent, 
Michael Malone. As is better understood now, but what was reported 
over the years in the Wall Street Journal and Florida newspapers, is 
that he routinely gave identical assurances to juries that he had 
examined the hairs of 10,000 people in his career and that there were 
only two or three occasions in which the hair from two different 
people was so similar that it couldn’t be distinguished. 
You’ve probably read and heard this now, but those assertions of 
the likelihood of a match—implications of statistical certainty and 
reliability—were a series of statements that were misleading if not 
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outright false or lies. As we know now, justice officials had blamed 
errors on isolated failures by rogue examiners, careless or inept 
prosecutors, or defense lawyers, but there was a suggestion here that 
practices might have been more systemic. And that, as an outsider, is 
one of the striking things to me: how long it took. And just to unpack 
this, as Mark Stolorow was just saying to me, progress has been sort 
of glacial in some areas. In 1974, researchers knew that visual hair 
comparisons were so subjective that different analysts can reach 
different conclusions about the same hair. In fact, even the same 
examiner, examining the same hair, can reach different conclusions 
at a different time. In 1984, the FBI acknowledged that hair 
comparisons can’t be used as a conclusive positive match for positive 
identification to say that “this hair came from this person.” In 1996, 
the DOJ studied the first twenty-eight DNA exonerations and found 
that twenty involved hair comparisons. In that same year, the FBI lab 
stopped declaring matches based on visual comparisons alone and 
began using them as a screening measure for DNA testing. 
Then comes this Brady task force review, where non-FBI scientists 
were finding that Malone testified beyond the limits of science, drew 
conclusions without a scientific basis, and exaggerated and misstated 
research. You’ve heard this, but this claim of personal experience 
was kind of a lie within a lie or a misleading statement within a 
misleading statement. In reality, examiners didn’t compare every hair 
they ever tested to every other one, only a pair at a time. Most times 
you wouldn’t expect the hairs to match because you’re dealing with 
maybe a male perpetrator and a female victim. And when comparing 
a crime scene hair to a hair from a known person, you wouldn’t know 
if you were mistaken. In other words, you’re rarely comparing hairs 
between two people such that you would be in a position to know 
that they didn’t match. 
And also agents told me, “You can’t remember more than a couple 
of hair comparisons once you’re done.” And they didn’t keep full 
notes or statistics or pictures. And, as we all know now, the key 
question here is how often might the hairs of two different people 
appear to match, and the truth is there’s no scientific way to know. 
7
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As the chief of the FBI hair team acknowledged in 2009, “The proper 
answer is we do not know.” 
So, my part of the story just was to see if there were other Donald 
Gateses out there—people who were sentenced to decades or life in 
prison; who were convicted through flawed evidence; should’ve been 
told about problems in their case; or might’ve been convicted through 
testimony by other agents using similar techniques or practices as 
Michael Malone. And that’s where I started, and what we did 
compared to everything else done before was fairly straightforward. I 
met Levick; well, first of all, my experience with forensic science 
was quite limited. I did hear about it, though, because when I first 
came to the D.C. federal court, I was meeting with judges. One of 
them said, “You should take a look at this,” pushed something across 
his desk, and it was a speech by Judge Harry Edwards, the former 
Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit Court who was the author of the NAS 
report. He had given a speech to the D.C. Superior Court, the 
criminal trial court in the district where these cases were happening, 
and in it he summarized the NAS report. My experience before was 
limited to when I was covering DHS; it was about 2006, five years 
after the 9/11 attacks, and they had put out a request to industry, to 
vendors, to develop a portable fingerprint machine. What they came 
back with was like a Kleenex-size popup box. It had red plate glass 
on all sides. You could have a suspect put their fingers on it; you 
could take this to a cave in Afghanistan or a boat, on a Coast Guard 
cutter or in the Mariel Straits off of Haiti. You know, you’ve got salt, 
spray, bad weather, the boat is going like this [tilting side to side], but 
you could beam it, get an instant fingerprint reading on databases. 
Meanwhile, the government said, well we like your first draft, 
industry, but you know all these things you have about incomplete, 
inconclusive, partial hits—can you delete those? We don’t need 
those. And you think, well that makes sense because this is for 
investigative purposes. It’s not to be admitted in a court. You’re 
looking for national security threats. But it never occurred to me that 
there was something other than a positive hit. Then the judge showed 
us this. 
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I met Levick who had been working on two more DNA 
exoneration cases involving defendants named Santae Tribble and 
Kirk Odom who had spent decades in prisons based on the testimony 
of two different FBI agents. DNA wound up showing that Tribble 
couldn’t have contributed the hair found at his murder crime scene, 
and only a different man could have committed the rape for which 
Odom was convicted. In Tribble’s case, the two different FBI-trained 
analysts who were asked to re-examine the hairs afterward failed to 
distinguish human hairs from a dog hair in the sample or agree in a 
sample whether a hair showed Caucasian or African-American 
characteristics. 
Fred Whitehurst and his lawyers at the National Whistleblower 
Center in D.C. gave us their files piecing together hundreds of 
reviewed cases without names attached. With these 10,000 pages of 
documents, the Post found more than 250 cases in which a scientific 
review was completed. We built a database after kind of using a 
Rosetta Stone approach, comparing case number to FBI case number 
to Justice Department case number to criminal court number and 
other biographical details of lawyers and dates. We found 137 
identified by name. One of them, Benjamin Herbert Boyle, was 
executed in Texas in ‘97—more than a year after the DOJ began its 
review but without being notified. He would not have been eligible 
for the death penalty without the FBI’s flawed work according to the 
prosecutor’s memo. A Maryland man serving a life sentence for a 
1981 double killing was another case where the prosecutor 
apparently never told the defendant of potentially exculpatory 
findings. Attorneys for the man, John Norman Huffington, say they 
learned about it from the Post. And these were just Malone cases. His 
case was vacated afterward. 
And then we found, in appellate opinions, examples of other 
agents who testified like Malone did, unable to distinguish among 
different people’s hair only once or twice in 2,000 cases or once in 
1,500 cases; others said 4,500 or 5,000 cases; one put the chances of 
findings two [indistinguishable] hairs at 5,000 times 5,000, so that’s 
2.5 million. And, of course, we found cases where prosecutors were 
9
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saying, “You know, we don’t know. Maybe it could be one in one 
million; it could be one in ten million.” So we reported this in 2012, 
and the Justice Department and FBI, to their credit, took great steps 
this time: re-reviewed the cases of all investigators, researchers, and 
forensic analysts in that hair unit; they included the defense, and then 
they concluded in 2015 that these problems were systematic and 
didn’t count hundreds of state hair examiners who were also trained 
by the FBI. 
So what are the lessons? After our story, the Justice Department 
Inspector General would say that as of 1999 the DOJ had enough 
information to review all hair unit cases, the action that they 
eventually took. It’s hard to say. We’ve heard the analogy of how 
often the system works. We’re reminded of the old adage—I can’t 
remember from which of the Founding Fathers it came, it may have 
been Thomas Jefferson—better ten guilty men go free than one 
innocent person be convicted. The assumption had been that there 
aren’t problems. The working assumption had been fingerprint 
examination is 100% accurate, 0% error. What we’ve since seen 
when the FBI re-tested hair matches using DNA, it found that in 
closed cases it was wrong 11% of the time. There’s been some 
testing when Virginia discovered a set of biological evidence going 
back decades. Similarly it was like a second set that had been kept 
by, I think, an examiner. They went back and looked and found that 
between 3% and 16%, depending on how you measured, of 
convictions contained errors. 
We’ve started to see that errors are a little bit more than the system 
may have understood, and that’s because DNA has been able to 
prove it. Part of the problem here has been—I think this is 
overstating it, but—sort of a “prove me wron”g attitude. Or certainly 
an attitude that “we know the evidence is good, but we don’t know 
how to say how good.” And in the absence of pushback or in the 
absence of science or research, there is this challenge of not going 
too far. So we found many FBI and DOJ individuals, not to pick on 
them, again this is the gold standard. These are the nation’s leading 
institutions that undertook the responsibility, and the burden of, this 
10
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duty to correct and to go backwards, not just to improve the system 
going forward—which they’ve done—but to go back and try to look 
at righting past wrongs and admitting error. 
But they were working in a system that was bound to defend 
convictions, uphold finality, and honor precedence. In this case, what 
the FBI and DOJ did was to lift procedural bars and statutory time 
bars to let people come back in. They agreed to offer mitochondrial 
DNA testing in cases where physical evidence remained. But at the 
same time, this is a story about how agencies limited disclosure of 
past problems because of the adversarial system. There was a 
comparison to airplane crashes, and analogies are all over the place, 
but we’ve also heard the defense community say, “well, when an 
airplane crashes, we have an NTSB; there’s zero tolerance for error, 
but there’s an effort to find the root cause of every error.” In 
medicine, people talk about grand rounds, that error is kept within the 
community—it’s private. But, within that community, there’s a 
ruthless pursuit of finding out what went wrong. Obviously, these are 
systems where there’s not somebody on the other side. The goal is 
safety; the goal is to save lives. There’s not someone trying to 
convict somebody and somebody else trying to defend them. 
And how do you square that circle? Which is, I think, the problem 
that you heard the last panel go deep into. But what’s striking to me 
is how many people have worked to strengthen the scientific integrity 
of the forensic science system in the United States, especially in law 
enforcement, despite any professional toll for themselves or how long 
it might take. Dwight Adams, the former FBI Lab Director, and 
Howd Headman, the former Hair Unit Chief, suggested to me that it 
was a good idea to retest using DNA, if possible, in all cases where 
[hair] evidence was some of the only evidence leading to conviction. 
It was FBI agents and scientists who pushed through efforts to test a 
sample of clothes to FBI hair cases using DNA. They are the ones 
who developed the law enforcement DNA testing protocol for hair. It 
was examiners who wrote frankly and honestly about what they 
believed had gone wrong or been done wrong, about both what 
Malone did and about the lack of openness. One of them said maybe 
11
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a cover up (that was my word), but this was her answer, “Maybe it 
wasn’t the intent, but it did seem to look that way. It was too 
controlled by the FBI.” It was Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael 
Ambicino in D.C. who pushed for the hair case review in the district 
that the Public Defender Service insisted and demanded and held 
their feet to the fire. 
And again it was the FBI and DOJ who committed to a review of 
bullet lead analysis with the Innocence Project and NACDL the last 
time that they had a technique that was based on pattern evidence 
where they thought that there were industry standards and 
manufacturing practices that they could show this batch of bullets—
this bullet at a crime scene—we know could come from this batch of 
bullets alone that we found in the defendant’s closet, in the suspect’s 
closet. It was only after the National Academy of Sciences showed 
that actually there was too much signal to noise, that the chemical 
trace signatures that the FBI built—this unique among the world—
had pioneered the development of this science after the JFK 
assassination, turned out twenty-five years later that you couldn’t 
conclude anything more than it was signal to noise. 
So, I’ll close with some thoughts from a reader. After our stories 
ran, he wrote in a letter to the editor: “I was reminded of the 
importance of investigative journalism, inspectors general, public 
defenders, public interest groups, and the Freedom of Information 
Act. Without the supporting roles of each, we might not be educated 
and enlightened to the degrees we are now about law enforcement’s 
curious treatment of forensic evidence when lives can hang in the 
balance.” And the writer went on to call for a continued attention, 
and really a discussion like we’re having now, of problems. 
“Anything less would be unforgivable in a democratic nation that 
prides itself on the enduring, nonnegotiable principles of liberty, 
equality, and justice for all.” 
And thank you to our hosts and everyone here for upholding those 
values and continuing that conversation. 
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